St. John's Law Review
Volume 44
Number 3 Volume 44, January 1970, Number 3

Article 29

CPLR 4102(a): Withdrawal of Jury Demand Permissable Without
Opposition's Consent in Absence of Reliance
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

1970)

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

statute [of limitations], is to be expected of any court cognizant of
the nature of the problem. 67
Nothwithstanding this sound advice, it is patently clear that one cannot anticipate this specific reaction from any given court, particularly
since the validity of Seider attachments in other states is at best questionable. Furthermore, the court is assuming that the foreign forum
has a statutory provision similar to CPLR 3211(a)(4) and, that if it
does, it will construe it as we construe that section. Upon reflection,
perhaps the best advice offered by the court is to have the plaintiff
sue originally where he can get in personam jurisdiction over the defendant. This assumes, of course, that the defendant has assets in another jurisdiction over and above the insurance policy coverage which
could be attached in a New York Seider-based action. However, if
there are no other assets or if the judgment sought in New York will
not exceed the policy limits, there is no need for the second action. And
using the quasi in rem Seider-based action initially, a New York resident plaintiff receives the benefit of a New York jury and the exceptionally large verdicts for which they are notorious.
ARTICLE 41
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CPLR 4102(a): Withdrawal of jury demand permissible without opposition's consent in absence of reliance.
A party to a civil action must assert his right to a jury trial by
including an appropriate demand in his note of issue at the time it is
filed. 08 If none of the parties makes such a demand pursuant to
CPLR 4102(a), the right will be deemed waived by all. However, once
either party so reserves his right to a jury trial, it is unnecessary for
the opponent to assert the right on his own behalf since "[a] party may
not withdraw a demand for trial by jury without the consent of the
other parties."'169 Thus, if a demand has been made by one party, the
other may rely upon it as if he had made it in the first instance. 170
In Downing v. Downing,'7 ' the first department found it necessary
to examine the purpose behind 4102(a)'s stipulation that all parties
167 59 Misc. 2d at 673, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 945.

168 CPLR 4102(a). The party must also serve all other parties with his demand. Any
party served a note of issue not including a demand for a trial by jury may demand such,
by serving every party with demand, and filing the demand within fifteen days. Id.
109 CPLR 4102(a).

170 Schnur v. Gajewski, 207 Misc. 637, 140 N.Y.S.2d 82 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1955)
(assent of all parties must be obtained before demand for jury trial may be withdrawn by
plaintiff since court is unable to speculate whether or not objecting defendant would have
independently demanded this right).
17132 App, Div. 2d 950, 302 N.Y.S.2d 334 (1st Dep't 1969).
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must assent before a jury demand can be withdrawn. The majority
found that the provision is meant "to protect the party who in reliance
on his opponent's demand for a jury trial properly fails to make de172
mand in his own note of issue."
Since a note of issue must be filed in order to place a case on the
court's calendar 1 3 it is usually the plaintiff who files first. In Downing,
however, it was the defendant who did so, and no demand for a jury
trial was included in his note of issue. Plaintiff subsequently demanded
a jury trial, and the controversy arose when the defendant objected to
plaintiff's motion to withdraw her jury demand. Despite 4102(a)'s
apparent prohibition of such unilateral action, the motion was granted.
The appellate division affirmed trial term's order, reasoning that the
defendant could not have been in a position to object to plaintiff's
subsequent withdrawal of her demand since, in light of the fact that
he filed his note of issue first without making a demand, it was logically
impossible for him to contend that he relied upon her demand to
safeguard his right to a jury trial. The court noted that the defendant
was in no way prejudiced because the same result would have been
achieved if the plaintiff had not subsequently demanded a jury trial.
In opposition to the majority's position, and in reliance upon two
earlier decisions,1 74 the dissent called for strict interpretation of the
statute. However, the two cases cited by the dissent are readily distinguishable in that the defendants in those cases were not first to
file the note of issue. Instead, they relied upon the plaintiffs' demands
for a jury trial.
Furthermore, the dissent's concern over the possibility that the
defendant had been forced to expend much effort and undergo great
expense in preparation for a jury trial is equally meretricious. If such
were indeed the case, the court, in its discretion, could have granted
a jury trial pursuant to subsections (d) and (e) of CPLR 4102 without
interpreting subsection (a) in the literal sense suggested by the dissent.
CPLR 4112: Propertime to request jury poll in a two-stage trial held
to be at conclusion of second stage.
The right of the nonprevailing party to poll the jury'7" after a
verdict has been rendered is deeply entrenched in the common law of
172 Id. at 351, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 336 (emphasis added).
173

CPLR 3402(a).

Schnur v. Gajewski, 207 Misc. 637, 140 N.YS.2d 82 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1955);
Huntsberry v. Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 199 So. 2d 196 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
175 One object of polling the jury is to ascertain whether the jurors in fact agree with
the rendered verdict and to insure that no juror has had a change of mind before entry
of the decision in the minutes of the court. See Labor v. Koplin, 4 N.Y. 547 (1851).
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